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ABSTRACT: The central Fodorian objections to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) can be taken to include an ‘Analyt-
icity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept 
possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine those two challenges and 
point out two misunderstandings to which the challenges are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist ver-
sion of IRS and argue that this version meets the Fodorian challenges head on. If sound, this line of argu-
ment shows that there is no problem of principle in the consideration of IRS as a good candidate for a the-
ory of concepts. 
Keywords: analyticity; theoretical circularity; Rationalist IRS; Complete Frege Test.  
RESUMEN: Las objeciones fodorianas en contra de una Semántica del Papel Inferencial (SPI) pueden concebirse co-
mo incluyendo un ‘Reto de la Analiticidad’ y un ‘Reto de la Circularidad’, los cuales son principalmente re-
tos a las explicaciones que SPI proporciona sobre la posesión de conceptos. En este artículo presento las 
teorías del papel inferencial, examino críticamente estos retos y señalo dos malentendidos a los cuales están 
expuestos. A continuación, presento con detalle una versión racionalista de SPI y defiendo que esta versión 
supera los retos fodorianos directamente. Si es correcta, esta línea argumentativa muestra que no hay un 
problema de principio en la consideración de SPI como una buena candidata para una teoría de los concep-
tos. 
Palabras clave: analiticidad; circularidad teórica; SPI Racionalista; Test de Frege Completo. 
Jerry Fodor’s battery of persuasive arguments against Inferential Role Semantics (IRS 
henceforth) or what he calls concept pragmatism (Fodor 2004, 2008) has at least one 
positive upshot in that it leaves one with the formidable task of providing a better in-
sight into the relation between concepts, conceptual content, concept possession and 
explanatorily legitimate approaches to the mind. There are three clearly distinct lines 
of argument that Fodor and allies have launched against IRS, that is, the general thesis 
that concepts are accounted for in terms of the roles they play in the cognitive life of 
thinkers. The first is devoted to showing that such theories are incompatible with 
compositionality. The second argues that the theories only provide unprincipled ex-
planations. The third denounces that any account along the lines of IRS is irremedia-
bly circular. While I hope to have provided the response to Fodor’s first line of argu-
ment (Verdejo 2009a), in this paper I would like to examine and critically respond to 
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both the second and the third. These lines of attack—which I will call the ‘Analyticity 
Challenge’ and the ‘Circularity Challenge’ respectively—are closely related. In a way to 
be seen shortly, they are both challenges to IRS accounts of concept possession. 
 Two important points of clarification will emerge in the critical examination of 
these Fodorian challenges. In the first place, and contrary to what other authors have 
strongly supposed, the ‘Analyticity Challenge’ is (who would have thought it!) not really 
about analyticity. Secondly, the Fodorian ‘Circularity Challenge’, although certainly 
about circularity, is not about what I term theoretical circularity, that is, the circularity that 
arises from equivalences in philosophical or scientific research. After characterizing 
IRS in some detail (Section 1), I will address these points about what really is at stake 
in Fodor’s hostile arguments in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4, I will offer a particular 
account of IRS, which (following the analysis in my Verdejo 2009a) I will call Ration-
alist IRS. In Sections 5 and 6, I will defend the idea that the propounded account of-
fers a genuine kind of explanation in the theory of concepts. The moral shall be that, 
while Fodor can still be right that IRS or concept pragmatism is a “dead parrot” 
(Fodor 2004, 32), he is nonetheless wrong that it is so because of the unprincipled or 
circular character of the explanations it proposes. Since everything I discuss has to do 
with IRS, I will begin with a handy characterization of the theory. 
1. Setting the stage for Inferential Role Semantics 
The expressions ‘Inferential Role Semantics’ or ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’ or ‘Func-
tional Role Semantics’ (IRS for short) refer to a family of theories that have as a cen-
tral contention that conceptual content is determined, at least in part1, by the con-
cept’s role in the cognitive lives of thinkers. This thesis, which can be seen as stem-
ming from the roughly Wittgensteinian motto that “meaning is use”, has received dif-
ferent articulations. This is not the place to offer a detailed account of each possible 
theoretical alternative. In fact, I wish to focus on one specific version of IRS. Thus, 
here I will be arguing in favour of an IRS that has rationality as its fundamental ex-
planatory notion. This makes my position closer to neo-Fregean accounts (Peacocke 
1992, 2008; Wedgwood 2007). Alternative kinds of IRS include those versions that are 
more psychologically oriented (e.g., Block 1986; Harman 1987) or lead to so-called 
‘two-factor theories’ of meaning (e.g., Block 1986; Loar 1982; Field 1977) or define in-
ferential roles in syntactic terms (e.g., McLaughlin 1993; Rapaport 2002) or involve 
semantic approaches consonant with a deflationary view of truth (e.g., Horwich 1998, 
2005) or privilege inferential roles over truth-conditions (e.g., Harman 1974) or simply 
explanatorily reduce truth to inferential norms (e.g., Brandom 1994). Nothing of what 
I will say in this paper should be automatically counted in favour of any of the alterna-
                                                     
1 The “at least in part” caveat points to the fact that inferential roles, if narrowly conceived, only provide 
a full account of conceptual content when completed with accounts of the reference of the con-
cept—what Peacocke (1992) called a “Determination Theory of Reference”. For ease of exposition 
and once this is clarified, I drop the caveat in what follows. Relatedly, it bears emphasizing that infer-
ential roles are not taken to determine contents in the sense that contents just are inferential roles: 
what is essential to IRS is that conceptual contents supervene on inferential roles (see Greenberg and 
Harman 2006). 
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tive kinds of IRS just mentioned. Nonetheless, it is my view that many of the consid-
erations to follow could be counted as support of alternative kinds of IRS, insofar as 
they can either accommodate the role of rationality in neo-Fregean accounts or else 
invoke some other notion that is credited with an equivalent explanatory role (what 
exactly this role is will be the topic of Sections 4-6 below). 
 From the simple characterization just given above, it follows that, in the context of 
the theory of concepts, IRS is primarily a thesis about conceptual content. By general as-
sent however, the inferential role of a concept C—arguably together with the world—
gives not only the content of C but also i) the individuation of C and ii) the possession con-
ditions of C. The first part of this assumption comes from the traditional view that 
concepts are (fully) individuated at the semantic level. Even if this view is not univer-
sally shared (see e.g., the informational position in Fodor 1998, 2008), it is clearly the 
rule rather than the exception. The second part of the target assumption is, even if 
perhaps not always explicitly stated (although see Peacocke 1992), the natural position 
to take in the context of an IRS. This can hardly be surprising. The central contention 
of IRS is, as advanced, that a concept C inherits its content via its role in the cognitive 
life of a thinker. It follows rather directly that what subjects have to ‘do’ in order to 
possess C is just to instantiate C’s specified conceptual role in their psychological 
economy.  
 The fact that standard IRS involves the twofold assumption just mentioned may be 
controversial in the light of accounts of concepts that reject the postulation of epis-
temic conditions for concept possession (e.g., Fodor 1998; Higginbotham 1998). 
There is, furthermore, no logical impossibility in conceiving an IRS in which this as-
sumption does not hold. It is crucial, however, to note from the outset that the kind 
of IRS targeted in the Fodorian attacks is one for which these assumptions do hold. 
Thus, in the discussion to follow, for any subject S, concept C and inferential role IR, 
IRS is committed to the following (a) and (b): 
(a) A certain IR specifies the concept-individuating content of C. 
(b) For S to have C, is for S to instantiate IR in S’s cognitive life. 
From these tenets it follows that, in the context of an IRS, issues concerning (con-
cept-individuating) conceptual content are ipso facto issues concerning concept posses-
sion. With this broad characterization in mind, we are in a position to discuss the 
Fodorian challenges.  
2. The ‘Analyticity Challenge’ 
The Fodorian ‘Analyticity Challenge’ aims to show that there is a problem of principle 
in explaining conceptual content and concept possession via inferential roles (Fodor 
and Lepore 1991, 1992; Fodor 1998, 2004). This is the roughest outline of the chal-
lenge. According to IRS, the content of a concept is determined by the inferences in 
which it intervenes. Now, either all such inferences constitute the concept’s content or 
else only a restricted set of them do. However, it cannot be that—according to a holist 
version of IRS—it is all the inferences that are content-constituting because—granted 
the idiosyncrasy of a subject’s total inferential repertoire—contents of concepts pos-
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sessed by two or more different people could not possibly be considered as contents 
of the same concept—that is, (concept-individuating) conceptual content could not be 
publicly possessed. This is why, following Fodorian prospects, “holism is preposter-
ous” (Fodor 2004, 36).2 On the other hand, if it is a restricted set of inferences that is 
content-constituting—according to a molecularist version of IRS—there must be a 
principled way of deciding or a definite criterion for specifying which inferences be-
long to the set and which do not. However, the only way available to an IRS for doing 
that is by appealing to one form or other of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Alas, 
this distinction cannot resist the well-known Quinean criticism. Therefore, molecular-
ist IRS is fairly certainly not correct given the impossibility of providing a principled 
account (see Fodor 2004, 35, for a succinct exposition of this train of thought). 
 In this paper I would like to offer a response to this challenge (see Section 5 be-
low). I must now make it clear that, despite powerful appearances to the contrary, 
there is very little reason to think that Fodor and allies’ real ‘Analyticity Challenge’ is 
precisely a challenge about analyticity, that is, a challenge about the notion of truth or 
validity in virtue of meaning. Instead, the Fodorian concern must be, really, with a 
principled notion of content as accounted for by IRS theorists. In other words, given a 
concept C, and a content-constituting inferential role CIR, the proponent of IRS must 
appeal to some definite non-stipulative criterion for the fixation of CIR. However, we 
can, and arguably we should, assess the principleness in question without bothering 
much about whether such principleness relies on analyticity or not. If true, the claim is 
important and it amounts to identifying one of the biggest distractions possible in the 
discussion of concepts. Since, furthermore, this is news for authors who, in the light 
of the Fodorian challenge, try to formulate a satisfactory notion of analyticity (e.g., 
Boghossian 1993, 1997; Rives 2009a), it is worth articulating in some detail the justifi-
cation of this claim. 
 To begin with, and remarkably enough, in this particular dialectical context, no-
body—not even the Fodorian—really relies on Quine’s developments in “Two Dog-
mas of Empiricism” (1951), let alone on Quine’s developments regarding the rejection 
of the analytic/synthetic distinction. As regards Fodorian developments, there are 
several places where it is simply obvious that the Fodorian dialectical stance is very 
much not Quine’s; indeed, that Fodorians must take much care when they go shop-
ping in the Quinean market.3 More importantly, there is a remarkably wide consensus 
that, whatever Quine actually showed in “Two Dogmas”, he did not show that there is 
                                                     
2 For some theorists at least (see e.g., Block 1995; Bilgrami 1998), holism is a perfectly respectable alterna-
tive, one worth arguing for. For present purposes however, I will just grant Fodor’s contention. 
3 Here I refer to such theoretical niceties as Quine’s position in “Two Dogmas” involving: 1) a holism of 
confirmation which—under a verificationist conception of meaning—leads to semantic holism; 2) a 
strong connection, and arguably an inescapable one (cf. Boghossian 1997; Rattan 2008), to the inde-
terminacy thesis defended in his Word and Object (1960, chap. 2); or 3) an attempt to “draw ontological 
conclusions from epistemic premises” (Fodor 2004, 35). All these Quinean views are of course un-
palatable itches for a good Fodorian and so they receive different scratches. Detailed discussion 
should be left for another occasion.    
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no workable, philosophically respectable notion of analyticity.4 Several authors have 
proposed notions of analyticity that allegedly escape the clutches of the Quinean cri-
tique, whatever the precise interpretation of such a critique may be. In effect, the the-
sis that there is some respectable notion of analyticity, even after Quine’s celebrated at-
tack in ‘Two Dogmas’, is a thesis shared by authors of practically all flavours (e.g., 
Grice and Strawson 1956; Putnam 1975; Sober 2000). These include authors both un-
sympathetic (e.g., Boghossian 1997) and (remarkably enough) sympathetic (e.g., Rives 
2009a) to Fodor’s atomistic view of concepts. They also include (more remarkably 
still) Fodor’s own developments. Thus, for instance, Fodor (1998, chap. 4) spells out a 
notion of analyticity based on semantic intuitions, precisely the ones that Fodor’s In-
formational Atomism may explain away by appeal to Putnam’s one-criterionhood. 
Another, not less important, instance of ‘Fodorian analyticity’ is found in Fodor’s 
purely referentialist approach to Frege cases. The target notion of analyticity is based 
upon syntactic properties of representations, as opposed to its semantic properties 
(Fodor 2008, 71). All this shows that, even by Fodorian lights, there is some respecta-
ble notion of analyticity. It seems quite clear therefore that no-one here—not even the 
Fodorian—is really relying on Quine’s critical views, let alone Quine’s critical views on 
the analytic-synthetic distinction. 
 Leaving aside Quine’s developments, two further sorts of reflections show that an-
alyticity is not the real issue at stake in the ‘Analyticity Challenge’. On the one hand, a 
notion of analyticity seems pretty much inescapable from the point of view of realism 
about meaning and conceptual content. This is so even if we grant the illegitimacy of 
the notion of truth or validity in virtue of meaning as an explanatory notion. To a very 
rough approximation, if M is your candidate for the meaning of C, then the fact that C 
means M is, according to your theory, a truth in virtue of the meaning of C. If devoid 
of any explanatory weight, this is probably an innocent truism. Generally, any realist 
theory of meaning or conceptual content must acknowledge the existence of whatever 
truths the favoured theory allegedly puts forward and of whatever follows from those 
truths. They will be, in a very clear and innocent sense, truths in virtue of meaning or 
conceptual content.5  
 On the other hand, one would have thought that, if analyticity were the real issue 
in Fodor’s challenge, then any defender of IRS would invariably be a defender of the 
(explanatory) notion of analyticity. However, we have a significant case in which noth-
ing of the sort happens. Under Peacocke’s articulation of IRS (Peacocke 2002, 2004a, 
                                                     
4 In other words, we take it that “strictly speaking, Quine in ‘Two Dogmas’ did not show, or even argue, 
that there are no analytic truths” (Fodor and Lepore 1992, 57, their emphasis) or that “Quine didn’t 
prove that you can’t make sense of analyticity, definition and the like” (Fodor 1998, 46, his emphasis) 
and hence we can “doubt that Quine’s sort of arguments, taken by themselves, are decisive against 
semantic molecularism [or IRS]” (Fodor 2004, 35). 
5 Cf. Boghossian’s illuminating remark that meaning realism ensures the existence of analytic inferences 
(Boghossian 1993, 80). Here I extend Boghossian’s point about inferences to any meaning facts to 
which a realist theory is inescapably committed. However, since I am denying analyticity, so consid-
ered, any explanatory role, I am also denying its explanatory role regarding knowledge of a priori 
truths and hence I am not here buying in on Boghossian’s (1997) notion of epistemic analyticity.  
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2004b), the account of concepts is intrinsically connected to the notion of the a priori. 
However, the notion of the a priori “should not be involved with the uninstantiated 
and uninstantiable notion of ‘true in virtue of meaning’” (Peacocke 2002, 377).6 If 
Peacocke and Fodor agree on the rejection of analyticity, then analyticity is clearly 
shown to be orthogonal to the IRS debate. 
 The foregoing considerations are not considerations to the effect that there cannot 
be a notion of analyticity that might be relevant for assessing the Fodorian challenge. 
A theorist might try to formulate or argue for the legitimacy of such a notion, one that 
is not (a simple version of) the notion of truth or validity in virtue of meaning. I am 
quite prepared to concede that there might be some such notion of analyticity. None-
theless, the line of argument presented above clearly shows that, even if one could get 
to a relevant notion of analyticity, assessment of the Fodorian challenge and of the le-
gitimacy of analyticity are projects that are quite independent of one another. Indeed, 
the requirement that the notion of content be principled is a requirement that one 
must face even if and even though one rejects/accepts some version of the notion of ana-
lyticity. In this context, it seems quite reasonable therefore just to abandon the query 
about the notion of analyticity and ask directly: can an IRS come up with a notion of 
content that is principled? Before answering this question, however, I would like to 
examine Fodor’s newest objection to IRS. 
3. The ‘Circularity Challenge’ 
Fodor (2004, 32) presents what I call the ‘Circularity Challenge’ as being a new argu-
ment that he has recently formulated (see Fodor 2004, 40-46 for the presentation of 
this argument). Recent as it is, there are nonetheless different versions in circulation.7 
For present purposes, we can summarize the challenge thus. Take the inferential role 
(IR) of a concept C. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that IR correctly 
specifies the content of C. Fodor’s contention is then that, in order for IR to also spec-
ify the putative possession conditions for C, it must invariably presuppose possession 
of C on the part of the subject. The reason is that for IR to constitute C’s possession 
conditions is for IR to be provided by reference to C’s role in a subject’s cognitive life. 
However, one cannot consider C’s role in a subject’s cognitive life without thereby as-
suming that the target subject understands or grasps C, or somehow represents the 
content of C. In other words, even if inferential roles can satisfactorily give an account 
of conceptual content, as soon as one tries to extract from it an account of concept 
possession “vicious circularities arise” (Fodor 2004, 46). 
                                                     
6 See also Peacocke 2004b, 92-93. Another significant case of rejection of analyticity from the point of 
view of an IRS defender is found in Harman (1999, chap. 5). Note in passing that Peacocke’s com-
mitment to the notion of a priori is not one I would like to pursue here (see Section 4). 
7 In what follows, I ignore Fodor’s less central circularity considerations with regards to sorting capacities 
(Fodor 2004, 39-40), to dispositional accounts of rule following (Fodor 2008, 34-40) and to the no-
tion of computation (Fodor 1998, 9-12). The circularity involved in accounts of sorting and disposi-
tional rule following can be understood as particular instances of the general case presented in the 
main text. The circularity attack based upon the very notion of computation is quite a different sort 
of objection and need not concern us here. I address this last objection in Verdejo (2009b, chap. 3). 
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 Remarkably, this objection is also meant to apply to cases where IRS seemed at 
first more secure, namely, cases of logical constants such as conjunction. If sound, it 
would force us to conclude that IRS is not even correct for logical constant concepts 
and “then it would seem that there are no examples on offer of how the conceptual 
role of an expression might determine its content and its possession condition” 
(Fodor 2004, 42).  
 Before delving into a response to Fodor’s challenge, it is important to note that 
Fodor is not as clear as he might be on how we should understand the ‘Circularity 
Challenge’. At some points, Fodor misleadingly suggests that the questionable circu-
larity has to do with the fact that IRS precisely formulates accounts that explain at the 
same time content and possession conditions of concepts. For instance, in the follow-
ing passage: 
Here’s what I take to be the source of the problem. The basic idea [of IRS] is that implicit defini-
tion [of e.g., logical connectives] can specify a concept’s inferential role and thereby determine its 
possession condition. But, even if you like inferential role semantics, you might well wonder 
whether any one stone could kill both these birds. After all, the inferential role of a concept has 
to do with which of the arguments it’s involved in are valid. Whereas which concepts a creature 
possess depends on what mental state it’s in. In consequence, the constraints on formulations of 
possession conditions are arguably quite different from the constraints on implicit definitions. 
(Fodor 2004, 42; emphasis his) 
 In my view, Fodor’s considerations in this context are quite beside the point. For 
the point is not whether IRS is circular because it integrates accounts of conceptual 
content—via suitable inferential roles—and concept possession. Indeed, the kind of 
circularity that one might think Fodor is worried about here is of a harmless kind. It is 
an instance of what I dub for present purposes theoretical circularity. In order to see 
clearly what goes under the label of theoretical circularity it is helpful to consider the 
following example from economics. 
 After a brief examination of the manuals on the subject, one can readily appreciate 
that standard doctrine in macroeconomics defines gross domestic product (GDP) as 
the total amount of goods and services in a given territory over a period of time—the 
commonly accepted measure of what Adam Smith called “the wealth of nations”. A 
closer look at the manuals can make one appreciate further that the notion of GDP 
conceals three very interesting equivalences. On the one hand, we can understand 
GDP as being a function of the demand of a given country, that is, the sum of all the 
spending on goods and services within the economy. Secondly, a country’s GDP can 
be taken, from the point of view of the income, to be the total of incomes earned in 
the economy. Finally, from the perspective of the output, GDP is conceived to be the 
total value added by the goods and services produced in a given territory. Scientifically 
respectable prejudice in macroeconomics therefore has it that there is theoretical cir-
cularity in usual estimations of GDP: macroeconomic production, aggregate demand 
and income are explained in terms of one another. Thus, one cannot compute the to-
tal production of goods and services of a given country over a given time without 
thereby calculating the total expenditure on such goods and services, and the total in-
come generated in the production of those goods and services. This is so even if, ob-
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viously enough, demand, production and income are different sorts of things and 
clearly depend on quite different sorts of factors. 
 As the reader may suppose, I do not think it would be a good idea to quibble over 
theoretical circularity. This kind of circularity is ubiquitous in respectable science. All 
you need to have an instance of it is an (empirically grounded) equivalence. Roughly, if 
A=B, then it follows very closely that to say what A is, amounts to saying what B is 
(and the other way around). Not an easy thing to worry about. But this parallels the 
IRS case that concerns us here. From the quotation above, and following standard 
formulations of IRS (see Section 1), we should accept that the basic idea underlying 
IRS is that “implicit definition [of paradigmatically, logical connectives] can specify a 
concept’s inferential role and thereby determine its possession condition”. And we can 
grant that one “might well wonder whether any one stone can kill both these birds 
[viz. conceptual content and concept possession]”. Furthermore, it is also true that 
“the constraints on formulations of possession conditions are arguably quite different 
from the constraints on implicit definitions”. From all this however, it does not even 
begin to follow that IRS is relying on a kind of circularity that goes beyond harmless 
theoretical circularity, a very weak basis indeed on which to embarrass an IRS.  
 Of course, we take it that Fodor is not (or should not be) concerned with theoreti-
cal circularity. He claims that IRS or concept pragmatism promotes a kind of “vicious 
circularity” (Fodor 2004, 39). On the face of it, theoretical circularity is not of a (scien-
tifically regrettable) vicious sort. In contrast, the kind of circularity Fodor must have in 
mind is what I call explanatory circularity. Roughly, explanatory circularity takes place 
when in order to explain X one, shamelessly or however inadvertently, presupposes X. 
The Fodorian idea seems to be that if one explains, via inferences, what it is to possess 
the concept C, the theorist glaringly presupposes possession of C. 
 In the next section I begin to address the Fodorian challenges. The reader may re-
alize at this point that there is a way of meeting both challenges head on. In particular, 
if we can articulate a genuine kind of explanation (of conceptual content and concept 
possession) within inferential role theories, we would presumably have responded to 
both Fodorian challenges. The kind of account I am about to present is neither new, 
nor one that can convince the Fodorian that his own informational approach to con-
cepts is wrong. It is however one whose power and broad generality have not been 
sufficiently emphasized as a response to the Fodorian criticisms. It is also one that 
should convince the Fodorian to give up, once and for all, on the validity of the chal-
lenges under consideration.  
4. Rationalist IRS 
In Section 1, I characterized IRS as involving the following two commitments regard-
ing any subject S, concept C, and inferential role IR. 
(a) A certain IR specifies the concept-individuating content of C. 
(b) For S to have C, is for S to instantiate IR in S’s cognitive life. 
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Following the neo-Fregean approaches of authors such as Peacocke (1992), Evans 
(1982), McDowell (1994) and Wedgwood (2007), I add the following rationalist thesis 
(RT) to the general IRS picture: 
(RT) The IR associated with a concept C must be specified in terms of the role 
the concept plays in the cognitive life of a rational subject S. 
Thus, the target kind of IRS appeals centrally to the notion of rationality and, more 
precisely, to the notion of Rational Inferential Role (RIR for short). When added to the 
general characterization of IRS, (RT) results in the substantial, non-speculative thesis 
that the inferential role relevant for determining conceptual content and concept pos-
session must be an inferential role that respects (and hopefully completely accommo-
dates) the cognitive situation of rational subjects who have the target concepts. We 
can get a more precise idea of what this means via consideration of the Frege tests as-
sociated with a concept C.8 Take a pair of thoughts that differ only in that one con-
tains the concept C while the other contains the concept C’. A Frege test evaluates 
whether C and C’ are the same or different concepts, depending on whether a rational 
subject can accept one of the thoughts while still rejecting or being agnostic about the 
other (in which case they would be different concepts); or whether a rational subject 
cannot accept one and still not accept the other (in which case they would be the very 
same concept). In addition, and for our purposes, it is useful to define a Complete 
Frege Test (CFT) for a concept C as the set of all the Frege tests that would complete-
ly account for the RIR of C. The idea is that a CFT would provide us with the whole 
range of propositional contents containing a particular concept C that a rational sub-
ject would be in a position to accept, granted that this subject has C. Given a concept 
C, then, the RIR of C is constituted by the set of C-containing propositional contents 
which a rational subject who possesses C would accept if the question arose or, in 
other words, all the C-containing propositional contents identified in the CFT for C. 
 The idea underlying this characterization is simple once it is put to work. Consider, 
for instance, the concept Hesperus, the conceptual counterpart of our singular term 
‘Hesperus’. Now, a good specification of the RIR associated with Hesperus must in-
clude all the propositional contents that a subject is in a position to accept, in virtue of 
that subject being rational and possessing the concept. Thus, for instance, the target 
inferential role should include such facts as that any rational subject that possesses 
Hesperus would accept the propositional content That is Hesperus when perceptually 
                                                     
8 The consideration of Frege cases does not, in and of itself, involve an IRS, let alone a Rationalist IRS. It 
is open to a theorist to argue, for instance, that the accommodation of Frege cases, exhibited in Frege 
tests, can be made without appeal to the (semantic) notion of Fregean sense via a syntactically charac-
terized notion of mode of presentation (e.g., Fodor 1998, chap. 1; 2008, chap. 3). However, and even 
though I cannot elaborate the point further here, I am sceptical about the very consistency of a posi-
tion that accepts the individuation of concepts at the level of Fregean sense and yet denies that con-
cepts are individuated by considerations of rationality. See Rives (2009b) for a defence of a position 
along these lines. This position is closely related to Rives’ own account of analyticity in terms of Car-
napian meaning postulates (Rives 2009a). Suffice it to say that, in my view, if rationality—or some 
other notion playing its role—is not present to explanatorily support the semantic individuation of a 
concept (in terms of its RIR), it is hard to see what it would do in a non-question begging way.  
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confronted with such and such heavenly body in such and such position in the sky in 
the evening. Similarly, the target inferential role would include such transitions in 
thought as the one that goes from the propositional content That is Hesperus to That is 
a heavenly body or That is in the sky, or That is the evening star, etc.9 It follows from this—
and from standard Fregean doctrine—that the RIR for Hesperus will exclude thought 
transitions that go from That is Hesperus to That is Phosphorus. The very familiar reason 
for this exclusion is that a rational subject may accept the former while doubting or re-
jecting the latter. 
 By way of further illustration, let us consider the case of the concept water. A cor-
rect RIR for water would include, as part of its cognitive role, acceptance of the propo-
sitional content This is water when perceptually confronted with the liquid that fills riv-
ers, lakes, oceans and Jacuzzis on the Earth. In a similar vein, the water-RIR would in-
clude the transition from This is water to This is odourless, This is transparent, etc. Howev-
er, from among the thought transitions included in the water-RIR, the one that goes 
from This is water to This is H2O is likely to be missing. The reason is that a rational 
subject who believes the former, could still doubt or reject the latter. 
 The reader may note that the considerations above are very general, even if the 
analysis of different concepts may result in very different kinds of RIRs. For example, 
the concepts of logical connectives may be based upon Gentzen calculus and result in 
a general form of inference as their RIRs (instead of an account in terms of a particu-
lar set of (partially perceptual) inferences as in the cases of Hesperus and water). The rel-
evant roles of indexical concepts (such as I or here), abstract concepts (such as number 
or belief), moral concepts (such as justice or goodness) or ordinary concepts (such as chair 
or doorknob) may also differ greatly. The details—both of conceptual taxonomy and of 
the particular accounts for each concept—can, of course, be astonishingly hard to 
complete. Fortunately, we do not need a full explanation for the purposes of this pa-
per. It is enough that we note that, from a theoretical point of view, an account in 
terms of a rational IRS is conceivable and plausible. Indeed, a Rationalist IRS can in-
voke the notion of rationality in a non-trivial way (that is, via suitable CFTs) and 
hence offer a promising delineation of an IRS framework. 
 Notably, the notion of rationality at stake in this account does not, in and of itself, 
involve a commitment to the notion of the a priori or to the general view that “once 
the issues are properly formulated, all entitlement has a fundamentally a priori charac-
ter” (Peacocke 2004a, 2). A Rationalist IRS as understood here owes no reverence to 
traditional rationalist approaches for which the notion of a priori was fundamental. 
According to the propounded account, rationality is articulated in terms of Fregean 
                                                     
9 It is worth emphasizing that the transitions that may constitute the RIR of a concept C are not, in the 
general case, exhausted by (even if they obviously include) the transitions read off from a concept’s 
syntactic structure. Thus, obviously, the RIR of the evening star includes transitions from This is the even-
ing star to This is a star—and similarly for brown cow, red tomato and global crisis. But although a concept’s 
compositional structure can be of help in determining the inferential role of a complex concept, it is 
of no help at all in the elucidation of the inferential role of primitive concepts (see Rives 2009a for a 
similar point).  
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cognitive significance. Whether one takes this notion to be highlighted better in terms 
of a priori or a posteriori entitlement is a further theoretical question. 
 We can summarize the presented account in terms of two central theses regarding 
any concept C, subject S, and rational inferential role RIR. 
(a) A certain RIR—stated via a Complete Frege Test (CFT)—specifies the con-
tent of C. 
(b) For S to have C, is for S to instantiate RIR in S’s cognitive life. 
Now, I am highly inclined to believe (and therefore I am prepared to vehemently ar-
gue) that a Rationalist IRS along the lines presented here is neither unprincipled nor 
circular, and hence that it can meet the Fodorian challenges outlined above. 
5. Principled IRS 
The account I have been giving leads us to obtain a definite notion of conceptual con-
tent and concept possession, one that allows the proper specification of the rational 
capacities associated with a given concept. When those rational capacities are inferen-
tial capacities, a Rationalist IRS does give a principled criterion for deciding which in-
ferences are content-constituting and which are not. From a general point of view, 
that criterion corresponds to the individuation of a concept at the level of Fregean sense. 
More specifically, the proposed criterion is the result of applying, in a comprehensive 
way, the Frege tests associated with a given concept C which provide the correct RIR 
for C.   
 One can have, no doubt, infinite concerns about the propounded kind of theory. 
Among them, however, we should not reasonably expect to find the concern that such 
a framework is unprincipled. When we say that a certain transition must be included in 
or excluded from the RIR of a concept C, we are not making an arbitrary contention 
or proclaiming the legitimacy of a mere stipulation. The precise statement of the RIR 
for C has to do with the overarching fact that rational subjects that possess the con-
cept just engage (or do not engage) in the target transitions. Explanation in Rationalist 
IRS is provided via appeal to the notion of rationality and to the testable facts sur-
rounding that notion. This is not, I submit, an illegitimate appeal, such as the appeal a 
theorist may make to the notion of analyticity. In contrast, the notion of rationality is 
precisely articulated here in terms of the results of Frege tests when applied to C-
containing propositional contents. In this context, to deny legitimacy to the Rationalist 
IRS account just provided would amount to denying legitimacy to the very concept-
individuating notion of sense widely accepted among philosophers. Thus, when we re-
frain from including the transition that goes from This is Hesperus to This is Phosphorus 
in the RIR for Hesperus, we are doing so on the basis of rationality. This basis allows 
us, for instance, to distinguish indefinitely many pairs of co-referential concepts: Cice-
ro/Tully, Aristotle/The tutor of Alexander the Great, Animal with a heart/Animal with a kid-
ney, Gold/Mineral with atomic number 79, and a very long etcetera. Our exclusion of the 
target transitions is not a fancy of our (Fregean) imagination but has to do with the 
analysis of deep facts concerning the rational capacities associated with our concepts.   
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 Scepticism with regard to the principled character of Rationalist IRS may stem 
from appreciation of some uncomfortable facts that I would like to highlight in the 
remainder of this section. These facts are, in my view, facts that any theory of concep-
tual content must live with. Nonetheless, they fall short of grounding any accusation 
of being unprincipled. Thus for instance, Rationalist IRS must, in the first place, live 
with the difficult statement of full accounts. The task of providing the full RIR correspond-
ing to a given concept is often not the easiest thing to do. To be sure, the most prom-
ising field for finding RIRs is that constituted by logical connectives and other syncat-
egorematic expressions. Beyond these cases, it may be very hard to find a ready infer-
ential schema that successfully defines the CFT associated with a given concept. The 
notion of CFT for a concept C is, according to the present considerations, an idealiza-
tion that gives us, more often than not, only a heuristics of the kind of account that 
would be most satisfactory once one is involved in the project of constructing a Ra-
tionalist IRS. It would be naïve to suppose that full accounts will always be available. 
This is nothing like the claim that IRS accounts are unprincipled in the disastrous way 
the Fodorian presumes. In particular, IRS seems here not to be worse off than any 
other kind of functionalist account. The problem of providing full accounts is pre-
sumably the problem for any functional analysis. It is therefore only to be expected 
that the functionalist kind of account that IRS promotes regarding concepts has, at the 
very minimum, the same problems as functionalism tout court.10 The usual absence of 
full accounts of the IRS of a concept should not make us conclude that such accounts 
are irremediably unprincipled.  
 The situation for IRS is aggravated because we not only usually lack a full account, 
but furthermore we can simply be wrong, and in some cases seriously wrong, about 
the content-constituting transitions for a given concept. The reason for this is (shame 
on us!) that we do not infallibly intuit the inferential roles that individuate concepts. 
Nonetheless, the fact that there is a clear possibility of error in the proper statement of 
the RIR for a concept C is intrinsically connected to the fact that people may fre-
quently engage in incorrect inferential patterns regarding C or in misapplications of C. 
In the light of this, it seems reasonable to conclude that positive assessment of the 
principleness of the explanations of a Rationalist IRS requires a criterion for distin-
guishing (not only content-constituting inferences from the rest but also) mere inci-
dental error (compatible with possession of C) from genuine irrationality (incompati-
ble with possession of C).11  
 The Rationalist IRS framework offers a rationale for distinguishing (not only two 
but) at least three clearly distinct kinds of case in which subjects may instantiate (in 
their cognitive lives) an incorrect transition from a true thought T, to a false thought 
T’, where both T and T’ contain a concept C as a constituent. To a first approxima-
tion, this rationale is based upon reflection as to whether the fact that subjects make 
                                                     
10 A particularly clear example of this is the current ‘variability debate’ among neuroscientists about the 
very possibility of full functional characterizations of areas of the brain—such as paradigmatically 
Broca’s area. See Grodzinsky and Santi (2008) for a recent overview of the available functional analy-
sis of Broca’s area. 
11 I owe this point to an anonymous referee for this journal. 
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such invalid transitions is compatible with their having a plausible cognitive value that 
would make such transitions rational. First, thinkers may make the transition even if 
they possess full mastery of the concept C. For instance, a subject may accept as valid 
a transition from That is the evening star to That is not the morning star. Instantiating some 
such transition would be rational simply because the cognitive value associated with 
The evening star is (following standard Fregean doctrine) distinct from the cognitive val-
ue associated with The morning star. Secondly, thinkers may make the transition because 
they have partial understanding/misunderstanding of C. For instance, Bert may cor-
rectly believe that Arthritis is a rheumatoid disease and somehow infer wrongly that People 
may have arthritis in their thighs. Following standard anti-individualist doctrine, when 
Bert’s individual history is appropriate, this is a case in which Bert possesses arthritis 
but does so by virtue of the relation to his social environment. Bert can thus be at-
tributed the right cognitive value for arthritis in a way that makes him rational in spite 
of his mistaken transition. Critical thinking and non-standard theorizing are also in-
stances of this second kind of case. Following Burge’s (1986, 716) analysis, we can at-
tribute the right cognitive value for atom to Dalton in spite of his instantiating the 
transition from This is an atom to This is indivisible. In general, partial understanding of C 
and wrong thinking involving C are, when the appropriate individual and external 
conditions hold, clearly compatible with rational possession of C. Finally, thinkers may 
make the transition in such a way that no suitable cognitive value would plausibly 
make it compatible with the thinker’s rationality. A person’s sincerely carrying out 
transitions from This is a carburettor to This lives in the African veld, or from This is red to 
This is not coloured indicates that this person instantiates the third case regarding the 
concepts carburettor and red. To be sure, all this needs refining. Particular examples and 
limiting cases could make it hard to decide, sometimes, whether a given inferential 
pattern belongs to one or other of these three kinds of case. We can still confidently 
claim to have a definite criterion for telling the distinct cases apart, based on the at-
tribution of appropriate cognitive values. 
 Comfort with our RIRs is further put to the test by the existence of deep theoretical 
questions for which we lack a ready answer. A central example of this is the existence of 
so-called Mates cases (Mates 1952). These are cases of indirect propositional attribu-
tion that putatively show that synonym expressions—such as ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmar-
ried man’—do not pass the Frege test associated with those expressions. It is for ex-
ample possible that Oscar accepts that Jack believes that John is a bachelor while still 
doubting whether Jack believes that John is an unmarried man. A number of different 
solutions have been given, from a Fregean point of view, to Mates cases. These in-
clude restrictions on the application of Frege tests (Peacocke 2000) and a particular 
semantics for ‘that’-clauses (Pietroski 2000). Apart from specific developments, this 
shows that there are deep theoretical questions that await the proponent of RIRs. The 
existence of such theoretical problems, however, cannot warrant the accusation that 
explanations of a Rationalist IRS are unprincipled. 
 In short, accounts along the lines of a Rationalist IRS are hard to complete, cer-
tainly fallible and subject to problematic theoretical questions. Give or take a bit, these 
are all bad news for Rationalist IRS. Even in the implausible case in which these are 
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problems specific to a Rationalist IRS, they fall short of being the devastating problem 
that such accounts are unprincipled; that is, that they do not provide a definite criteri-
on for the individuation of conceptual content and concept possession. Now, on the 
assumption that all this is more or less correct, there is of course the possibility of at-
tacking IRS on the basis that it amounts to unpalatably circular accounts. 
6. Non-circular IRS 
From the previous discussion (Section 3), we are in a position to note that Fodor’s ac-
cusation of circularity does not (or at any rate should not) concern what I have called 
theoretical circularity, namely, the circularity that arises from theoretical equivalences. 
The circularity threat to IRS accounts of concept possession must therefore be con-
sidered in terms of explanatory circularity, that is, the type that holds when, in order to 
explain some phenomenon X, we presuppose X. It might seem that there is firm 
ground for such an accusation. The proposed characterization of IRS maintains that 
for a subject to posses C, is for that subject to instantiate a RIR in his or her cognitive 
life, where the RIR is determined by the role the concept plays in a rational mind that 
possesses the concept. Explanatory circularity might seem pretty obviously present for 
the Fodorian to see. According to this interpretation, we are faced with an instance of 
an account of roughly the following form: 
For S to have C, is for S to accommodate the workings of a mind that has C. 
This reading of the characterization of Rationalist IRS is however, not merely unchari-
table, it is clearly wrong. The crucial point is that the expression “having C” in each of 
its occurrences in this schema is not to be interpreted as operating under the same descrip-
tion. The second occurrence of the expression “having C”, but not the first, is con-
strained by the requirement that it is a rational subject that possesses the concept. In 
other words, the general explanation of concept possession proposed by (Rationalist) 
IRS is one in which concept possession in general is explanatorily reduced to rationally 
constrained concept possession. This rationality requirement has substantial conse-
quences for the account of concepts. When considering the quite different issue of 
compositionality, it crystallizes in the specific requirement that inferential roles must 
fix a condition for something to be the semantic value of the concept (see Verdejo 
2009a). The regulative role that the notion of rationality plays for our present purpos-
es can be stated through the following lemma: not just any situation in which a subject 
may be taken to exhibit possession of C is a situation in which a subject instantiates 
the inferential role of a rational subject that actually possesses C. The latter, rational no-
tion of possession is far narrower than the former. 
 The Fodorian contender may wish to reply by emphasizing that the appeal to a ra-
tionally constrained notion of concept possession in explanations of concept posses-
sion is useless because such a notion involves, inter alia, possession of C. Someone ca-
pable of instantiating the RIR for C is someone who rationally understands C, or grasps 
C, or somehow mentally represents C. Circularity, the Fodorian would conclude, is 
still with us. 
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 In reply, the defender of Rationalist IRS must insist that the circularity in question 
would be in order only if the notion of concept possession involved in the articulation 
of the RIRs for C was the very same notion of concept possession that it aimed to ex-
plain. As it happens it is not; thus no circularity is justly attributed to such accounts. 
Any account along the lines of a Rationalist IRS offers an explanation in terms of the 
inferences or judgemental schemas that capture the Fregean cognitive value associated 
with the concept and very much not an explanation in terms of the general, pretheoret-
ical or commonsense notion of concept possession. Such explanations have a maxi-
mally informative character. This is illustrated by the variety of forms that a Rationalist 
IRS can take. As is well known, they can consist of or heavily draw on, an implicit def-
inition (of, e.g., a logical connective) (Peacocke 1992; Boghossian 1997). They can also 
involve transitions from perceptual states to certain judgments, as in the case of ob-
servational concepts such as red or square (Peacocke 1992) or partially observational 
concepts such as brown cow (Verdejo 2009a). Alternatively they may specify the role of 
a concept as a consequence of the appreciation of the correctness of a certain identity 
statement (Peacocke 2008, esp. ch. 5), or of certain definition, or implicit conception, 
involving the concept (Peacocke 1998; 2008, ch. 4). Yet again, in some cases, these 
roles can be interpreted as a consequence of sensitivity to the normativity constitutive-
ly associated with the concept (Wedgwood 2007, esp. ch. 4). None of these accounts 
presuppose the notion of concept possession as it appears in the relevant explananda. 
These are not vacuous or self-satisfying accounts of the kind ridiculed by Molière’s vis 
dormitiva. Far from it, they are attempts to explanatorily reduce the general unexplained 
notion of possession or grasp or understanding of C in terms of an (eventually ex-
tremely complex) analysis of the roles that C plays in the cognitive economy of a ra-
tional thinker.12 
 At this point, the Fodorian may still wish to stress that intentional notions of the 
sort appealed to within Rationalist IRS are not really explanatory at all. A real explana-
tion needs a reduction not to some (rationalist) inferential role at the intentional level, 
but to some other, non-intentional vocabulary.13 It is only because the defender of Ra-
tionalist IRS aims to provide intentional explanations that this defender thinks he or 
she may succeed in the project of achieving explanations of concept possession. How-
ever, the Fodorian could argue that in trying to provide such intentional explanations, 
                                                     
12 Fodor’s failure to see this is not very easy to explain. The dialectical situation faced by the IRS defender 
seems to me entirely analogous to the one Fodorians would face if one complained that Fodor's own 
1998 account of concept possession in terms of locking presupposes what it seeks to explain because 
for a subject to be locked to Cness in the way that is required for possessing C is for that subject to 
actually instantiate the mental representation for C. This would do nothing to support an accusation 
of circularity, precisely because the notion of concept possession to be explained is not (and is far 
wider than) the notion of possession of a worldly related mental representation that appears in the 
explanans. 
13 This way of interpreting the Fodorian challenge is consonant with the responses to the ‘Circularity 
Challenge’ offered by some authors who articulate either a dispositional account (Weiskopf and Bec-
thel 2004) or a pragmatist account (Prinz and Clark 2004) of inferential roles. As we are about to see, 
nothing of the sort is fairly required of a Rationalist IRS, even if a Rationalist IRS might be compati-
ble with such reductive programs.  
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the theorist opts for the wrong kind of explanatory reduction. Concept possession, 
when explained in intentional terms, can only be presupposed in a complexity that is 
as yet to be specified. 
 The response from the defender of Rationalist IRS seems to me to be quite 
straightforward. For, patently, the circularity objection cannot really require of a Ra-
tionalist IRS that it offer non-intentional explanations. It is clear that this kind of IRS 
does not and cannot provide such explanatory reduction. As we have seen (Section 1), 
IRS is committed to accounts of concept possession in terms of the instantiation of 
concept-individuating inferential roles. When these inferential roles are of the sort re-
quired in a Rationalist IRS, they can only be provided by reference to such intentional 
notions as propositional attitudes and cognitive value. In this context, the Fodorian 
objection is really just a rejection of the framework for a Rationalist IRS. Even worse, 
it seems to have its roots in the idea that possession conditions, as such, must not ever 
be characterized in terms of concept-individuating semantic notions, let alone inferen-
tially articulated semantic notions. In other words, it amounts to an objection in terms 
of theoretical circularity, of precisely the sort we have seen cannot warrant a respecta-
ble accusation of circularity (see Section 3). The Rationalist IRS is a framework in 
which possession conditions are given in terms of semantic conditions. This version 
of the Fodorian objection therefore just begs the question against the IRS defender. 
 Fodorians who seek to mount a satisfactory circularity challenge to Rationalist IRS 
by appeal to the need for explanatory reduction to non-intentional categories face, in 
effect, another problem that is, I tend to think, simply disastrous for their strategy. For 
it is not only the case that the requirement for reduction to non-intentional notions 
would beg the question against the proponent of RIRs; in addition, there is very little 
reason to suppose that such explanatory reduction, if possible at all, would not be 
compatible with Rationalist IRS being true all the same. This story is in effect quite 
familiar and it tries to reuse some of Fodor’s strongest contributions (see Rey 2004 for 
a similar line of argument). The idea is, briefly, that inferential roles identified at the 
intentional level in a Rationalist IRS could plausibly be the very same roles that a non-
intentional story about concepts would reduce at the physical or mechanical level. The 
thesis that to possess a concept is to instantiate a certain inferential role at the inten-
tional level is clearly reminiscent of (and indeed provides strong support for) the thesis 
that to possess a concept is to token a mental representation with a certain syntactic or 
causal role at the physical, realization level. According to this, the project of formulat-
ing a correct IRS for our concepts and the project of providing the correct causal 
chains for our mental representations could be understood as different parts of the 
general enterprise of devising a functional and naturalizing approach to the mind.  
 Difficulty in appreciating this point may come from the fact that the usual Ration-
alist IRS theories are clear examples of purely a priori reflection, and as such arguably 
insensitive to empirical information of the sort needed in such naturalizing accounts. 
However, the task of providing correct RIRs, and the associated Frege tests, can in-
deed be sensitive to all sorts of relevant empirical data. This should not be surprising 
since claims in Rationalist IRS are clearly counterfactual supporting. On the assump-
tion that we have identified a candidate RIR* for C, our account is utterly vulnerable 
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to considerations of the sort: if RIR* were not constitutive of having C, one should 
find people that reasonably count as having C without their fulfilling RIR*. Or similar-
ly, we would be sensitive to the reasoning that, if RIR* were really constitutive of hav-
ing C, one should not find people who lack C in spite of their conforming to RIR*. 
This is not to say that we should start conducting experiments in order to legitimate 
our IRS account, as if we should rely exclusively on verified data. We can however 
conceive of rationality more in accordance with the model of psychological facts than 
with the model of a priori theorizing. If that is true, nothing prevents Rationalist IRS 
accounts from being part of an overall empirical and naturalizing approach to the 
mind.14  
 These points can be summarized thus: it is one thing to explain concept possession 
by recourse to a notion that presupposes concept possession. It is quite another to 
explain concept possession by recourse to a notion of concept possession articulated 
in terms of rational inferential roles. The latter kind of account, but certainly not the 
former, involves explanations that are maximally informative and arguably part of em-
pirical and naturalizing framework. If this line of reasoning is minimally sound, it 
shows that IRS, at least under the rationalist version I have been considering, is not 
fairly seen as falling prey to an unpalatable sort of explanatory circularity. 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I have undertaken the task of meeting the Fodorian ‘Analyticity’ and 
‘Circularity’ challenges. When all is said and done, we can see that analyticity is not the 
real issue with regard to the former challenge. Apart from the orthogonal character of 
analyticity considerations, I have argued that an articulation of IRS in terms of Frege 
tests—what I have been calling a Rationalist IRS—equips us with a bona fide criterion 
for principled determination of public content-constituting inferences. As regards cir-
cularity, we have seen that, even if a theoretical kind of circularity can correctly be at-
tributed to IRS—as in any other respectable field that relies on theoretical or empirical 
equivalences—it is not the case that it should also be attributed a vicious kind of ex-
planatory circularity. 
 The question of whether we can successfully come up with a complete and fully 
satisfying IRS theory, no doubt, awaits further exploration. In the meantime, it is 
worth emphasizing that there is no problem of principle with an IRS account. It is 
consistent with all I have said here that, ultimately, it is some kind of informational 
view that will offer the best insight into the nature of concepts. The present point has 
                                                     
14 Similar considerations can be brought into view so as to defend the idea that a Rationalist IRS can also 
benefit from the discoveries and results in the literature on judgment and decision making. Studies 
such as those carried out by Wason and Johnson-Laird, among many others, strongly suggest that 
humans are irrational in systematic ways. Far from being an obstacle for the statement of a Rationalist 
IRS, such studies can be extremely useful in providing empirical evidence about which possession-
constituting RIRs should be automatically discarded for the (rational but) real subject and about the 
precise nature and limits of human rationality for the purpose of formulating correct RIRs for con-
cepts. 
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been that this almost certainly will not be the case because IRS is unprincipled or circu-
lar.  
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